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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the management strategy of the
Coast Guard Reserve; it examines the formulation and
implementation of strategy.
A model to develop and implement strategy is proposed, which
defines the role of the budget in this strategic management
process. The recent strategy of the Coast Guard Reserve is
analyzed using this model. The analysis seems to Indicate
that the Coast Guar: Reserve had no explicit strategy An the
19E's; however, the Reserve did execute ar. ImplIcit
strategy as inferred ficgi its actions. This implied
strategy enjoyed varying degrees of success depending on the
e n c:f evaluation.
Whei- th - c~ri: ton, shows limited success, recommend
s-utiono tL the varIour problems. A principe solution
_VC'CVo s t> Coat. Guard Reserve expanding and formalizing
th strate::: process, including the use of the budget as a
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This study responds to a need for strategic planning by
the Coast Guard Reserve. The intended future direction for
the organization, and the corresponding commitment of
resources, wil require a firm foundation and clear vision
to deliver a successful outcome. The first need is for a
theoretical framework to distinguisl and relate the critica:
components in the strategy management process. Ezowered
wi; this knowlede decision makers can the- more
effectively devise and imperement an appropriate strategy.
Severa' factrcis corrzine to make these choes re
ritic C- for the CcFst Guaid Reserve. FIrst, recent rapid
:orw .W .atc:..na. expenditures on drug arnter'c
fes imacted the active duty Coast Guard's emphasis, and
consequently the Coast Guard Reserve. Second, competition
fcl fu:d-ing In the Federal Budget arena may change because
of Gramm-Rudman deficit restrictions and the growth of
appropriations in entitlement programs. Third, military
programs may come under further pressure towards reduction
given the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Finally, demographic trends may reduce the pool of
entry level youths for the Armed Forces.
This environment of constrained resources will dictate
obtaining maximum value from resource commitments.
Successful competition for these resources may require a
clear articulation of an organization's costs and benefits.
Investments may last longer and become more irreversible.
The impact of decisions could increase, as the number of
choices declines. Since strategy focuses on decisions about
the future, the subject may prove especially useful in these
timeZ.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of th studv L to develop a :-ctctype of
the Zt:ategic management process for use by the Coast Guard
L t- EtI focuses on management'r inte:tion to
adieve objectives, and use of available resources to that
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question asks: ho- 'S the strategy
of the Coast Guard Reserve implemented ir. its budget
Subsidiary questions examine:
- What is the definition of strategy ?
- What was the past strategy of the Coast Guard Reserve ?
- How effective was that strategy
- How can the strategy be improved ?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis examines the practice of strategy by the
Coast Guard Reserve. It examines decisions on the future of
the organization, especially its use of resources to
accomplish goals. To examine strategy, the goals will be
discerned, and consumption of resources will be related to
the accomplishment of the goals. The budget provides a
useful framework for this analysis because it relates
resources anC goals by consumption and accomplishment.
'. scope inc e strategy f or.u ' ation anu executicn.
.- %es~r. assume- & basic know"edge o management
activi e  az t'-. Coast Guard Reserve on tle par: c f the
readet .
e yc ear s e q enIa h r ough four main
... h=i e,ced sequnt, s r at eg
- _ .. . <a_ to de i e uae cr... ..... of¢- str-ategy
-- A . n- re mza.& t. the Coast Guard Reserve tc Infer
- EvauLating the success of that strategy aga-.s-
Usi~g the budget to devel op solutions to the various
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis proposes a model for developing and
executing strategy. The methodology includes a literature
review to develop a model of strategy. Then, that model is
applied to the Reserve program over the past decade to infer
te organization's strategy. Next, analysis discerns
factors for success or failure, identifying key issues and~
problerr, .. Fcllowi.ng this, various solutions are recommended
for these problems. The thesis concludes by recommending a
formalized strategic planning process to solve current
problems andi avoid recurrences in the future.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
t- e s i s organization parallels t.e rethodci ogy.
-esen:ts theoretica" elements c" taeya~
>:ze a model. Chapter 11 applies thE rrodte to
t :a te T, cf the Reserve prograr the past
a,-evaluates the ef fectiveness oc te
a ident f.a E; som~e shcrt:zomlngs. C ha pt e --
s an6makes recom-mendatioz:
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II. STRATEGY: A MODEL
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to provide an oveiview of strategy to
be used as a foundation for later evaluation of the Coast
Guard Reserve. The budget is a component of strategy, and
wi: subsequently serve as the focus for analyzing the
Reserve.
- s strate- of the Coast GuaLd Reserve
depends fiist on a defir.ition of the tern, "strategy."
a- e S Z' S.ekfetse
-sPevIZ .m i i nary questfo; . inc uding
I..... sLate ', a n th - Loe cf +he budg e r .. s. .rategy.
"ueht o .r provide a foundatio. to exp'ore
tn+ sratego of the Coast Guard Reserve.
-2:arte:, e-...h sectio1  explores different
as pec-. cf :L ]. Sectron. B. delineates the conditions
w...... c~ete the need for strategy. Section C offers
severs. def.i~ions of strategy, places these definitions in
the business context, and introduces the role of the budget.
The following section expands these definitions, to view
strategy as a system with formulation and implementation
stages. The next section addresses the role of the
strategist in directing the system. Then comparison of
military and business strategies further illustrates the
decisions made by the strategist. Finally, a format to
evaluate strategies is provided, along with a discussion of
ultimate control systems for the different strategies.
B. BASIS FOR STRATEGY
Nature contains the basis for strategy. Scarce
resources and the competition for survival are fundamental
laws of nature. Yet only man with the ability to
conceptualize, symbolize, and reason can practice strategy.
Through thinking and planning, organizations hope to prevail
by expioiting advantages in obtainin: anc using resources.
Strategy is man's response to the following conditions
Fie resources
- U.certaint" about a--- adversary's. capability and
:.nention
_rr ver_-ible com-i o
eec tment of resouices
- Necessity of coordinating action over time and distance
- Unce~tainty, aout control of the initiative
- The cric ia nturf: 3 the adversaries' mutua"
:et s of each other (Albert and others,1983,
The history of mankind reports the survival and growth
of those organizations that excelled at strategy in response
to these conditions. Continued failure in this activity
leads only to extinction.
Hence, successful survival is one reason to study
strategy. Both business and the military have the need to
survive in their different environments; their goal is to
prevai even in the face of adversaries. Surviva' serves as
6
a catays.t to other organizational goals. Without
existence, the organization cannot accomplish its remaining
goals.
Wherever the above conditions exist, one individual or
organization can dominate an opponent through effective use
of strategy. Decision making and uncertainty characterize
this climate. Therefore, strategy seeks to provide a method
for making those decisions which critically affect the
outcome cf the competition. 'he definitions offered in the
n !:: 5ecrl-on p!ace decision-s at the coe o' strateg.
C. CORPORATE STRATEGY
1. Definitions
-.>" t c:n comes from Steinei, speaking of
t:> &E~ccpcra:- s- rategy as:
.. c:-i t cation of opportunItie a.d threats
t:e future, which in combination with other
-e-&evant data pzovide a basis fol a company's making
bettei current decisions to exploit the opportunities and
to avoad re threats. (Steiner,!79,p. 14)
AndrewE offers a competing definition of strategy
the pattern of decisions in a company that determines
and reveal.i its. objectives, purposes or goals, produces
the principa: policies and plans for achieving those
goals, and defineS the range of business the company is
to pursue, the kind of economic and human organization
it is or intends to be, and the nature of the economic
and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its
shareholders, employees, customers and communities.
(Andrew,1980,p. 28)
7
Evered distills these definitions even furthe:,
saying:
strategy i dominated by the determination
of.. .purpose. .. , and by consideration of the future
character of the firm in relation to opportunities,
threats, and constraints. (Evered,1983,p. 61)
Note the absence of any unique features which would
exclude non-profit or military organizations from these
definitions. Business organizations operate in the
commercial arena, where survival is motivated and sustained
hy prVfit. Naturaliy then, catalysts and threats to making
pr c f i I f .r he core of 4ht busiz. e;.::onment and
corporate strategy. But the definitions ca. extena' tc any
c om .etitiV environment as previously descri.Le . Strategy
deai wt!_ critical decisions, organizational purpose, and
Z---threats and opportunitiev.
2. Model
The.s.e 6efi.ii' s hel concept uaize t..e idea of
strategy, but they do not provide a methodology to practice
ztraecy. Definin;.. strategy as a process, p:ovides a means
to ap,'y the previous concepts. In this manner, Steiner
defines strategy as:
a process that begins with the setting of organizational
aims, defines.. .policies to achieve them, and develops
detailed plans to make sure that (they) are
implemented.. .to achieve the ends sought.
(Steiner,1979,p. 14)
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With strategy thus defined, a model of the strategic
process can be derived to further illustrate the mechanics
of applying strategy. Andrews separates strategy into
"formulation and implementation" (Andrews,1981,p. 41)
stages. The formulation stage focuses on "deciding what to
do;" while implementation points to "achieving results."
Andrews' model of this process is shown below:
PORMULATION IMPII N AT.IOO -
(VICIDING WHAT TO 00L (ACHIEVIHO IbSULTS)
I. .nt~ficd~tiOo Of ~ I OT1n010Et10 IOn tCtoO 1.4. I IS
S .oppor.*fCORP RiTEsk sA - rL|ltlonsoig,
SIATICT; ,! k'Iho,
m~tgr-a' tI- ! t, ij,flajn~jt or
12. rpoF=0 IO 0*11 : 2
S3. I.rSOr& t., , S efinng
. . ... t o..
Figure 1 (Andrews,1980,p. 41)
a. Interrelatio of Staes
Andrews' general description of a complex system
shows each stage as a separate component to aid
understanding; however, no such clear distinctions occur.
Steiner describes the overlap saying "planning cannot be
disentangled from such management functions as organizing,
directing, motivating and controlling." (Steiner,1979p. 4)
9
He refers to a report from a Conference Board Survey
describing the manager in multiple roles:
...his role as planner is meshed with his role as
organizer, director, and so on, in a seamless web of
management; for instance, the thought he devotes to what
might be termed planning questions, and decisions he
makes about them, have implications for his exercise of
control; and vice versa. It is the whole of his job
that must be looked at, the interaction of the elements
of the management process rather than the individual
elements. (Steiner,1979,p. 4)
The overlap attributed to the manager's roles
al ies to the strategist. Decisions in one area
-r: act cecrsionZ in othE" areas. But the initia' cycze cf
Ltratey proceeds logically frcm the formulato:. to the
plemeta--o. stage. As an iterative process, one stage
su'orts the next.
b. Formulatiorn Stage
The formulation stage produces alternatives,
.sry fc- tht , fc" owing reasons:
Alternative strategies can improve the adaptability of
the organization in two ways. Fi.st, by explicitly
exarmi:ning alternatives, it is likely that the
crganizat1or. will find some that are super2o: to their
curret: strategl . Second, the environment rmight change;
if alternative (contingency) plans have been prepared,
the organization is in a better position to respond
successfully. Alternatively, they can select a strategy
that performs well even if the environment changes.
(Albert and others,1983,p. 2-9)
The formulation stage requires information on
the organization, the environment, and the competition. The
decision maker determines the relevance of these factors and
10
considels t.e 6 futur:ty of present decisions"
(Drucker,174,p. 125). Steiner describes this as a look "at
the chain of cause and effect consequences over time of an
actual or intended decision...." (Steiner,1979,p. 13) Since
the number of alternatives and valuation of information is
highly subjective, the formulation stage yields an infinite
number of choices.
c. Implementation Stage
The implementation stage feeds ozi the
produced in the formulatic:, phase.
:-,-,ementation recuirez selection of the optLm-."-n. a"ernative
Lae on a a: abi!tv to be implemented and achieve the
~cs" zat-ona: goals: O: c selected, the strategy wi.1
~C.C.t at - a ~:t ..tU 1 az. 6 C I Sor. foi the o rg a,:iza t -c.c s
es C.'.Ce. Besider S-I-c.t-c, the implementation phase
focuses on contlo' activitie:, where contro" encompasses
c:i:re:t-nG a variable, or set of variables to
e_:ze a goa .. an; control system has three
C -r:en:s'1 : nked bv comm- .:cati ons, these include a
° 
. .. se1ect  t effectc (Anthony,Dearden,
an.- 5eaford,19 %,j. /j.
The-r function is similar to a thermostat.
(1) the thermostat has a thermometer (sensor) that
measures the current temperature in the room; (2) the
thermostat compares this measurement with a preset
standard of the desired temperature (selector); and (3)
if the current temperature is below the preset standard,
t.,e thermostat signals the furnace to turn on and send
heat to the room, and when the temperature reaches the
preset standard, the thermostat signals the furnace to
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shu .  off (effector). (Anthony,Dearden, and
Beaford,199,r. 8)
The strategy identifies key elements - factors
critical to its success. Control activities monitor these
factors and trigger responses to achieve the organizational
goals. The strategist's role in formulating alternatives
includes development of control activities. Alternatives
vary in the degree that they fit the situation, meet the
organization's goals, and are capable of controlled
i:, p! ementation.
The nee C] for external controls decrease:
'o-'cn= v ~wtL the increase in members' devotion to
t>. oganizatcn' goalE. Andrews emphasizes this place of
-vieL :n o:. -o systems, sayrn;:
A syste.7 c co..ro :- . ... supplemented Ly a ie'ective
.e: f exe-ut-\- rez...uitment and training. rc systern
: co:>, :.. : g: m: o: ".ewa .... aza penatizes, no
ecedures :f measuring and evaluating performance can
.... "- -ace o .e indiv:dua" whc has a clea- idea of
:%;.z a-c wuong, a consistent policy for himself...
,Andrews, 1900,p. 216.)
St. ener again emphasizes the importance of
eren.ta..aor. sayino:imp E " ei- . t "3 s
A final step in implementation concerns the control of
individua behavio- to insure the achievement of
the.. .plans .... It is only when activities of individuals
are directed toward the achievement of enterprise aims,
guided partLy through these techniques, that strategies
are really implemented. This involves the entire
process of management. (Steiner,1979,p. 265)
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6i. Adaptation and Flexibility
The initial strategy system concludes in success
or failurle. in an ongoing syster., failure prompts adaptive
change. The decision maker starts a new formulation phase,
his judgment evolvirng with the experience gained in losing
efforts. Steiner cautions against any end for this process,
saying:
it should . .. be conceived as a continuous process,
especialia with respect to strategy formulation, because
changeF in the businez-a envi ronment are continuou-c.
m~introduces the need 'Lo,- in the~
st :ate-~. ALit; :curmrtodate change is a consideration
W*.Z g ernat .?e st r-a-egJ e. :n a FI"C:e ':amic
-e-. -- 1 rra r c on ce n s e ec tr a
C3- dSCu :C, 7, ' this. poiihiL, provide-- a a.,
0~::.::, a.. 1110-eI ZC.L practicing strategy. Howeve:-,
serr.(- c-' the decisions are moZrE c:i;tica. than otherF, to the
outccrne cz, the competition. These critical questions
directly relate to the profitability of the business firm.
The next section ider-tifies the forces that will determine
the profitL-abi-'--ty and survivability of a business firm.
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e. Critical Issues
According to Porter, the businessman must
operate within an industry defined by five competitive
forces:"entry, threat of substitution, bargaining power of
buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry among
current competitors (Porter,1985,p. 6)."1 Porter's model
explaining these forces is shown in Figure 2. This model of
competitive forces will be applied to the Coast Guard
Reserve in Chapter III.
I ntr) fltrrit r% HiN airy Dletrmiostai
Economics of Scaile Industry grouith
I Iropriktar) product diffcrcucc% Fixed (or stora'e) ci"Ist/value added
Ilradii~ ileit Inotermittent overcai pcit y
Slitch Ii (vI% Product dilfcrcrices
Capital requiircniits Nei% F.Wtr2t1ts Brand idcrntity
Accss it) d istri but ioni Switching cos
Ahwiiit cost ads.i .gc Coiiieitlt ioniii andi hi Lrir1cc
P~ropt neary learing tiim c Infiormational coir iut~ty
Acccss iii ucssi ;rN u itw -1 hic , D ave rsity of conipctiors
P porie ta t lON%'C -ci pi oduct design NC%% I i'Corporate %take, C
6-.ct iinieiii Poio.c~ Exit barricrs
II~kp t~lct ilialisit 5
Determinants of Supplier Pits. er Determinsant% or IRuier Vtmesr
DI ie citiit oil of illtsl Bargainn Lever" ge Price Sensitivity
S nitcrtin ic-uts of stipplieis anid ft riit in t hs iii ut I fire.i1 " f Huyer concentration P'rice/ total purchas
ICieseue of substitute iiipiits Substitutes vcrsu% Firm concentration Product differences
Supplier concenttratioun Buyer volume Brand identity
Imnpii aite of %oluii 14, sipphitBuer 11)T IA tchinig costS Imipact oat quality:
Cost rclatixc CI,, tutal puih~ssin the indiislu relative to firm performance
Itmpact of ml oilt ot m 0ii 1htrentaliti' S5%%s itae itchintg Costs Buycr profits
I breat ift lois a rd ictgiai u I chlat isc to thireat of Buyer information Dcision makers'
hie k waud itegi atiuti h\ Ability to backwaird iucenitives
firms ini the iudusti\ Deterina~unt% of integrate
Substitution I hreit Substitute products





Figure 2 (Porter,1980,p. 6)
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In the strategy system, the information to
initiate the formulation phase focuses on identifying these
industrial attributes as they pertain to the company and its
competitors. The company then calculates the futurity of
this information and develops alternatives, as previously
described on page 10. Porter fits business strategy into
one of three generic categories: "overall cost leadership,
differentiation, or focus (Porter,1980,p. 35)." His model
of the risk in these strateg-Jes is shown in Figure 3.
Control mechanisms target the significant risks of the
particular strategy.
RISKS OF COST RISKS OF
LEADERSIP D)IFFERENTIATION RISKS OF FOCUS
Cost leadership is not sus- DifferenitiatIon is 110t SUS- The focus strategy is imi-
tamned tamned tatcd
* competitors imlitate 0 Competitors imitate The target segment be-
* technlology elialipes * bases for differentia- conies structurally unat-
* Other bases for cost tion become less if- tract ive
leadership erode portazut to buyers 0 structure erodes
* demand disappears
I'roxir.ity in diffecotia- cost Proximnity is lost Broad ly-targeted comnpcti-
tion is lost tors overwhelm the scg-
mcnt
" the segment's differ-
ences from other seg-
ments narrow
" the advantages of a
broad line increase
Cost focuscrs achieve even Differeiitat ion focusers Ncw focuscrs sub-segment
lower cost in segments achieve even greater dif- the industry
Figure 3 (Porter,1980,p. 21)
Por-ter's model upgrades the simple economic
model of supply and demand, which states that a market will
establish an equilibrium price at the intersection of the
supply and demand curve. This equilibrium price will
continue urless some force shifts the supply or demand
curve. In general product markets, the demand curve shifts
due to a change in consumers' income, the price of
substitute items, or the price of complementary items. The
sup y curve shifts due to a change in technoLogy o- price
changes in the factors of production. These curve shifting
Ca ,e : c rpond directly to the facrs Pc te includes
.is context, rne E tra t beomes a
:e < tc: cbtaln a comparative advantaqe oi monopsony in a
market fc: tn fac: c production or monopoly in the
fLnsht:d goods market. M equires a ti:ough knowledge of
th+ company's internal strengths and weaknesses and the
ex~trnal competitive environment. in a 'imited view, the
£ rategy process in business focuses on three processes
which seek to obtain, develop, and exploit a comparative
advantage:
- obtaining manpower, capital and technology (resources),
- combining them in an organization, using budgets and
other operational plans (transforming), and
- marketing and distributing finished goods and services
to consumers (output).
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Porter's model shows that a main goal of the
strategy process is to reduce the potential for external
forces to shift the demand and supply curves. Competition
could not displace a firm w.ith a comparative advantage in
providing a particular good or service. Business firms gain
and hold competitive advantage by becoming the most
efficient producer of a good or service, and focusing that
product to the needs a particular market. Ansoff's model
characterizes this market focus in his model of the types of
strategic thrust shown in Figure 4. These thrusts show
potential directions for an organization; they will be
applied to the Coast Guard Reserve in Chapter IV.
INTREPME
MIURAL CONTINUITY 04CCRIMIIIY
SIASU REACTIVE ANTICIPATING IMPOMING CREATIVE
\MARKETING
FID 1RPAMSIOIE I MEPANSIO To EXPANSION TO OPENING
ROOICTS - FANIA ELATED FOREI4N NOVEL
-AK-. WARKETS MARKETS 14ARKETS MARKtIS MRKETIS
STAILE NO
PRODUCT L RLTD NVL POE~N'N,.AL INCRIENTALaATC OV P ERN
TO MARKET PRODUCT, PRODUCT PRODUCTSTO ARKTS ADATATOR IMNOVATION ONCEPTS
ILASPO0 ON
P KNOWNI AflOPTIONIOF CRE ATION
DEFIENSIVE UCMMOLOGY NEW OF NOVEL
RECTV MAIO ET NARE . TECHNOLOGIES TICHMIOLOGIES
ART ,CI AGGRESSIVE SKARCN
PATINO OF MARKET SNARE
OKKARIIL. ADOPTION Of NEW MARKETIG CONCEPTS
I CRATNE INCNRtImG MARKITIMCNGGNUP!S
Figure 4.(Ansoff,1979,p. 65)
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The niche question focuses strategy or.
positioning an organization in its environment to achieve
-dominance. A dominant position results from compaiative
advantage. So, while the environment changes between
military, commercial and public sector activities - the
purpose of strategy, to achieve dominance, remains the same.
This dominance leads to survival and accomplishment of
dddition'al organizational goals.
The f undament a, processes of oLtaining and
;rYans f o,-nz- rescurces :"nto output are also the same in
/ta~ an cx..ercial activitie . BYsi a.s viewing
a.t.ena veS t o-. t- org a.. za en c desired
. tratecist. rrxu . consider t-.e 'neiL it- :L this
n ew c Z the e.vironment changes , a nd nev strategy
evolves to meet these changes, the oiganiation .ray need to
6lowing str-ategy seection, control activities
men ampeen onahio Tes.e cont-c act vitier wili vary
ng on the strategy. Stein-r notea, that:
No company ever made a nickel of profit by making plans;
profit flows from the implementation of plans. The aim
of strategic planning.. .is to formulate superior
strategies and to implement them effectively.
(Steiner,1979,p. 215)
The budget is a key mechanism for ensuring that
pofits occur with the implementation of a strategy. But
profits result from sales to markets external to the firm.
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T, t. bdget can only hope to target costs withir. the firm.
By controllii g costs - developing the product at a certain
eff.'ciency, the r)--oduct can be competitively priced f* the
external market. This pricing advantage leads to sales and
profits. The next section further describes the role of the
budget.
D. BUDGETS
A e an xa m. - :cst leadership strategy, a budget
form ta contrc syst.em. IT provides an
: _ .. :a.cr: as ets and de v a oroc.ct. 7he
thn- buczw tc target .s cos ir. the
u t c - . ie f C -Lu:. ent v u:,.e the
-Da -age. these : ets ae achieved, the strategy
.. .. ..... ...... . ..:et ;- efinition of budgets
oe.e.e by Ste~ie
a, IL entegratE:. t methcs to .. ans' a t e s -rategic
.. r. a ztons. They are guides zo action.
..-: : _. s~ta d s ,: coordin-at ed act o ant he
" a Z fs ccontrolling performance t , see that
.rnance with an.;. (Steine-, 25)
This definition parallels the use of budgets in
government organizations. Wildavsky cites multiple
definitions for budget including:
links betweer. f:nancial resources and human behavior in
older to accomplish policy objectives .... concerned with
translating financial resources into human purposes .... a
series of goals with price tags attached .... a mechanism
:: mak.ng choices among alternative expendtu:s. When
th--ho ices a.e related to one another so as to achieve
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desired goals, a budget may be called coordinated.
Should it include a detailed specification of how
objectives are to be achieved, a budget may also serve
as a plan of work for those who assume the task of
implementation. If emphasis is placed on achieving the
most policy returns for a given sum of money, or on
obtaining the desired objectives at the lowest cost, a
budget may become an instrument for efficiency.
(Wildavsky,1988, p. 2)
A the company implements its strategy, it operates the
control activities and monitors activity of its competitors.
Should the environment change, or the control activities
faiA, t. Ztrategist should implement another previously
&es.gnate2 alternative, or develop a new strateg.
.ess~'need some predetermined measure to evaluate
S ces cf the strategy, -n essence, a control mechanism
trig.. new fo-z.ulatlcn phasE. Succeszfu" business
-ne. :... . co.parativt acvantag- i: three main
[- *C es.E : yreviou "y en .E-rate '
- accuirr:.Q needed resources,
tr-anrf o:r.i:: then: ::. to goods or services, aind
- successfuLy deiver: -n ther., to the consume-
cidea>> t:e contro: systems monitor these critical factors
an,: predict the demise of the strategy with adequate no;:ce
to allow preventive or alternative action. Dissecting the
budget into smaller time frames provides a control system
which can signal smaller problems in daily or weekly cycles.
There must be someone at the core of the strategy
process to identify and make the critical decisions. The
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re:.:t section descz-ibes the role of that decision make-, or
strategist.
E. THE STRATEGIST
These models and concepts simplify the complexities that
the strategist considers. He views both the organization's
current si tuati on and the potential to assume more
advantageous positlons, such a focus is the very core of
a--:a. :.manageme:%. Drucke- p~:oncunceE th_- as
ta~:. c~fcc-rai7agemrent, saying:
fa ' .... ta .h
TL _i , :t , IL> task of thinkih~g through t:;e
!-.issior, cf th! business, that is, of asking the quest_--c
"What '- buZCmes s an:c what shoulCd It be 7" 1S
ead t , sett.z c~ objectives, the development 'f
..an. :a and the mak-:. o f oa
--c.- tomorrow's results. T his cea ca . -
org the business that zai s e-:
e h u nes. that. ca. make decisions tha affect-
en_ ir an,_ cn a ance objectives anC.
e EC. I c; ".i agaInZ- t 1 needs cj tomorrow; anr. tha
z) cate resources of men a nd mo ney to .e i-esut.
egi.s needs a thorough knowledge of his own
L 1 .I (ezpecia' " strengths and weaknesses" to
perform the fu;.ctions listed by Drucker. More importantly,
he requires perspective or. the external environment to
identi 'fy, threats and opportunities and to select the proper
niche. Finally, he needs the authority to cause execution
of the strategy. These requirements for knowledge and
vision limit the strategy function to top management. Thus,
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creating a .- ' eche is merely combining (or developing) the
organization's abilities with the opportunity where they can
best succeed.
Besides vision, requirements for authority also place
the strategy function in top management. Once the
strategist selects the niche, he must have the authority to
direct the organization towards that niche. He accomplishes
this dilecting with con c I systems, including the budget.
The know Iedge, vision, r. o.4ty and control components
sraeg oe tensvey with applications
in the riy With frequent exchange of eadei t
" twc systems, sucU Cver ap is not surp::su. The next
section cozpre: th. business ano mi :ta-y concept of
F. MILITARY STRATEGY
T h c- E- cf f t sepa:a ,s i ta y P, corporat
-rate; ye~.. ny of t,'-- pFCcesses and aeoiCIEons parallI
t.e hbsiness concept. Com;on definitns of mi itary
strategy emphasize the unique use of power. Liddell Hart
defines military strategy as "the art of distributing and
applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy.
(Liddell Hart,19%8,p. 335)" This mirrors Clausewitz, who
said "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with
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other -L.eas (C-ausewitz,1976,p. 6S)." The U.S. Joint Chiefs
c f Sta f f de.:-_es military strategy as:
The a-t and science of employing the armed forces of a
nat:c., to secure the ob-ectives of national policy by
the application of force, or the threat of force.
(Lykke,198,p. 3)
Even though use of force dominates this idea, many of
the techniques employed coincide with the business model.
Opposing forces seek to develop and exploit some comparative
advantae, in military settings, comparative advantage can
S .a - -e : su-p- moa ,
S.....Ogy, force size -,i geography.
" . c. e. to gal- these ypes cf advan.tge= tne-
S. n.es- ac ; C" C" - -t L Cec. ue
.. ... emert -trateg. As A&:-. atkr.s said :.-I his
:.... ::- z ii encE cc::.bine t 'c- the glue
T.e .. ilitar-  hasis c.. th- f-r.cticn . of Command,
C.t.z2 Corrur-icat-c ... and :r-teliigence (0 fits the
for,,..,ation and implementation phases ascribed to the
strategic process in business.
1. Formulation Phase
The inteliigence activity gathers information on the
opponent's strengths and weaknesses to initiate the
fo-.u "atio phase. Comnand. activities calculate the
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f- .- ity of present decisions and develop alternatives.
Communication forms the links between all activities,
transmi ting information to and decisions from the commancd
Ieve .
2. Implementation Phase
The commander selects the best strategy and issues
directives to combine forces and execute tactics. (This
parallels the budget in the business organization). In a
,- ta,. scenat he co.-. .e p-a-n , a se. -ie L. - -a-,-- ,
campc-: , whch wi1 acqui r- th - ultimate o ec-.ve.
t:.: clt.se h t ie , ' ste:ects con-- , .... w -- -Ae
cc:parative advantage wil YieL'C victcry. Through
cmmunic t', , tha ctnnM'eI transmnits te a.-- and
re eives" tav e.S zeort on Its e xezto.
c ..... s mu be araete . for examp, e,
r' C. ."T ";%--
Cc .. .. c E ce[ a I .' r . t:.rees th?,es e
a e-c ,:-.... .... , re comi a: e, rrus: Con'u L z to .L
a. tt:t es - commitment of additiona: forces. Comma:nd must
:, to e e r o _on ment for changes f ia res i the
strategy; when these occur, command executes a preconceived
alternative or reformulates the strategy.
3. Conclusion
The military model closely parallels the business
model of strategy. As Andrews observed:
Deciding what an organization should do and getting it
done a:e the universal functions of an organization
"eader, i. business or out (Andrews,1980,p. xiv).
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.. az-: - e. sten. fromr the common forces in the
respeztive environments listed on page 6. Each organization
also must formulate and implement a strategy using a system
similar to that developed by Andrews. The strategist
evaluates the environment, just as Porter depicts the
businessman analyzing industry conditions- seeking
ccmpaiative advanta(g e. Once this advantage is identified,
leaders, --. either organization decide on strategic thrusts,
Tebudgez iy a .C&i: rol.e "-.the a-~ r'ocesses
tzans:crmaticn, a-.-- ou-tput of the financial resc,-cei which
; a ... :. these tools a s .s t th:
-' ..do e o in .n -~ t a e y
- 1a devesoiz"ng ann execu '  ~.ae;
e- ' va uate ef fc ivenes i a, var ,e
- -_ -.. . ... -...... '..... -., -< c :o
G. EVALUATING STRATEGY
The prcces. for eva>Lating strategy a'sco confirms the
con'- stency between business and military theories. To
evaluate a prospective bus'rness strategy before execution,
Fue't proposes the following criteria:
Consistency: The strategy must not present mutual iy
inconsistent goals and policies.
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Consonance: The strategy must represent an adaptive
response to the external environment and to the critical
changes occurring within it
Advantage: The strategy must provide for the creation
and/or maintenance of comnpetitive advantage in "he
selected area of activity
Feasibility: The strategy must neither overtax availabl.e
resources nor create unsolvable subproblems. (Quinn and
others,J.988,p. 51)
Rthough these precepts address business, they are
equally valid for military applications and mirror the model
and ideas Previously presented. The importance here is not
tc finea ur..versal concept of strategy, but tc deve'.c, a
~:~l~ theoretical model and to tes'. it ap.yiny it
tc th, Cc_-ast- Guard Reserve. T h is provides a pro'_otyp-- wh~cr
z~~nza~nmay a~ter to pzoduc - m3 ,G app.:opriate
.oc~Ar.eventual model wi'' assist the organizat-.on irn
C s t--a t es A z y Z c. nc .e- t he fi-:A. s _ ste p J ~n
"Ir.ittat:n D a!- i agreein( o0.1 a strategi c
C: el ess. (Brysoi,1968, p. 69)"
0O',"-y the strateg*_st cazi designate the appropriate model
t~.anu experinc provides the best perspective to
seect the mode. His authority is necessary to implement
the strategy. His decision on model selection is subject to
-ultimate controls as explained in the next section.
H. ULTIMATE CONTROLS
Onre rma~or difference between military and business .4s
the nat-u-re of' their ultimate control system. A business
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seeks profrt and the military seekE to create peace, or in
th.e eve,.-.! of war-, according to ridce" Hart, "a betteir st-ate
of pfeac-, even if only from your own point of view (Lide.l
Hart2.1966,p. 366)." Without profit, a business cannot
SUr vkv. V o achieve peace, military organizations need the
willingness and6 ability to project 'fcrce. So, although the
mechanism i's different, each organization has an ultimate
cc.-.trzil system that supercedeE the immediate process and
- . - rc:'&te th.- srcess of the st:ateg. he s e
01 c:;nz at ioz which e na'--'
t o raniza tiLona go S.
cc- J mechanism,~ is much 1 ess appar:ent in
1 3 C, za~ o i A. m gove rnment- acti1v:ty L*e"Iend~s on.
o c cmme :c-a acti4VI'ieS wi.h pzvi c;e a
S:nanc.- vts ciite- At some
go~rr _twi :&stri: ct the
Os I o Cf Z ~e Z L. LI-,t-urn a~e th Fta
:-~en.~i .t ftK o-rnmn actiie. Then governm~ent
rm.--St r ef ua te t strategy, (Just as military and
E!siS L organizations) in order to survive when its
u..imae ontolmechanism, tax revenue, is triggered.
Drucker suprsthis contention, saying:
There aL'e limits to what government can actually raise.
There are:- ever, narrower limits to what government can
racs wthout damaging 'he econom": serioUsly or
uroen~gthe cohesion orA the body poli-'tic.. . .Above
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t, increased government revenue wi not stimulate the
eccno.my. It will either depress it and create what w
low c "stagfat1on," or it wil create mountinc
irflationary pressures .... Raising the share that
govevnment takes of the country's income above this
t-h sh.d does- not even produce increased revenue.
Revenue may actually go down. (Drucker,1989, p. 73)
No strategiSt, regardless- of his environment, can ignore
the ultmatE cont-o' system. Losses In business, casua'ties
:n warfazre, an tax revenues in government become the
c::i4iLt Const:a nt Ci.. a strategy's suc eCE - n the
I e ::... L I"v "oFnr.-e-. .n e cha engg ci strate ,: becomes
a- - -eat endE ai, th: meanL. As
Ae .- o e.a..i. n
Adjustyc cc,..e. " - you. means. " Ketermining ,:r
c ec v e. - .c.. an. coc ca culz:Zc:.- shCu d
".: ."c ' t: --:0 -ff r. •" cal-,
-.. . . i : - iisdo. se sr.e
._.-- ,--= %i-, .eer-E, a met io, tc z a t. re-oc e
,_.1m,..>r ... . c: ,.: _vti. W:t.out such
a ga..-_ t>.= st:aecy .2sk= failure throug, attritin
,'. s a eOF S. E ro.
- organ za .c goa an
their- ccast.
I. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chaptel presented stzoategy as a system concerned
with cr- tical decisions on purpose and the future, in
response to competitive conditions. Strategy involves a
cor.e:: process of formulation and implementation. This
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te process (aeveop, and uses a compar ativeadatg
t: ex~~ 
.S-tuatio- and~ achieve goals, :nc'ud:ng
C2 lnx r surviva. T h t strategist S&,ects Ah.
comparat:rve alv ant a ge an. arena for competition a-'ter
analysis o0 thT I externa' environment's thr-eats an d
* .C 1-t . t ie. Z H c orr.i ne s t h is knowled~ge wiJ.t 1 hi s
* n de -st1,a.-.cirng o f i nter-n alI organizationa7 Str::e n g th. anc
WE a: ne sS ez H:.s a -, t hc. -1ity allows hi m to direct t In
Z cn towards imp :nzoentatiJ'on of the E;t a tey.
71 S t e C aaciresses-: &nh e 
-
e- c L *-h e ~an z& a C c~ a ? (G~oals)
-Wh. th~. 1r~~r Eu onrnen
C1 '-. I
E e- %
as.~ I.. - oa L t cost. nthezU unes s
y, th~ strategi~t obtan a&c ,rnf~: eur
into some organizational outrput. In this way, the processes
ofL ,-Siness and military strategy are similar; however:, each
has a different ultimate control system, related to the
suxvva' of. the organization. Here again the budget
provI e- a gauge, relating cost, progress towards goals, and
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survive'- The strategy can be evaluated on the basi5 of
consonance, cons~.stency, feasibility, and advantage.
The next chaptE- w---' use these ideas on budgets and
strategy, as cri.teri.a 'Loy analysis of the Coast Guard
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III. STRATEGY AND THE COAST GUARD RESERVE
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the strategy of the Coast Guard
Reserve using the strategy model developed in the previous
chapter. Because no expli:cit strategic plan exists for the
Coast Guard Reserve, other- documents such as the program
de~c ± ~,budgt-t, , ant: the Commandant's Long Range View,
w1 r C;.t- i.ntormation to reconstruct the stray
cl strategy first requires -i.dent i J -'cat J; of
co:petsection E will cover this topic. c'h- next
s e 3.- C 6eZ , h)e t ho fo: mul a t ion phase c rn c'. d ing t he g oal s
aR. e n % .Oon Ien: Cr t h cr gani z at ion. F I_o o7 rn this,
aL, erila rvtes a~: -he.- f uturity are- examlriel. Firially, a
ccvet* or soytroK  .ex., including the budget, illustrates
am~p- n ementatior. of the strategy.
N.ote that the mesh cf management actiJvitiez i.ntertwines
each of the following sect.ions. Because of thi.s mresh, the
starting point is less important to strategy than relating
the decisions on "wht to do" and "how to do it." This
chapter seeks to reconstruct the answers to those questions
from the perspective of the Coast Guard Reserve.
B. COMPETITORS
Addressing competition and comparative advantage
requires identification of the opponent. However,
government agencies are different as Stegletz contends:
Government enterprises differ from private enterprises
in two important ways: they do not have to worry about
bankruptcy, and they usually do no have to worry about
competition. (Stegletz,1988, p. 199)
Porter's model provides a convenient framework to
questioi; Steglet.'E. contention, by identifying the
sup .lie , new entrants, buyers, substitutes, and intenSitr'
17"- av .: v .
- Sdpp', : errn:: lud- taxpaye:s ,'Cong ress (fund .c -  a. labor
era Zket , ow ) . x a e_
Ne; ev; trants a e gene ai v restriteL by the ega
mandate f ii- Corgre.z to peIfcr-n. specific mission=..
- ?uye- s gen.era I y do ot. exist, since services an e
povi'- as public goods, free of charge. However,
consunmer. of the services do exert politica" p ess.e on
.....ess to provide funding to the Reserve.
- SubZ'tutez are generaliy restricted also by thE :ega:
entrt' bar-ie: provided by the Congressiona' mandate.
..... .t of rivalry wil be examined below.
The Coast Guard Reserve faces political, economic and
military comretitozE . By definition, competition requires
an adversary, and any advantage is relative, applying only
to a specific opponent. The output of government agencies
is generally protected from competition by a legal mandate
which designates them as the sole provider of a particular
service. In this sense, the Coast Guard Reserve confronts
no competition.
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As a U.S. military force, the Coast Guard exists to
countez external threatz of force in the international
arena. Its wartime strategy must identify likely
competitors and develop plans to dominate potential sites of
conflict. Such a military focus is not the primary aim of
this thesis. However this military purpose must be
considered, as it provides an ultimate focus for the
organization's resources.
Zt>.r. ccvernment, agencies face po2itical competition
.C.esaional arer.a for funding. The size of the
Xrr, fu6ec by Congress can become a compa-ative advantage
azains the wartime adversary. The comprehensive strategy
rt :ecogn zt thisE competition for Congressiona funding,
ev> tncruc. there may nct be a specific competitor offering
t;.e same se rVics af the Coast Guard Reserve.
Th Ccast Guard faces economic competitors as it
ec:uLts manpower to perform the organization's missions.
Thr. competition. cffers little between the public and
p a sector. Withn the military, other services can
become competitors for entry-level youths.
Thus, the Coast Guard Reserve faces multiple
competitors. Strategy hopes to relate a means to dominate
these competitors, who change with the focus. As shown in
the model, an organization prevails by exploiting some
comparative advantage in either obtaining resources,
transforming them into products, or delivering the eventual
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output of the organization. The political and economic
competition occur in obtaining resources; the military
competition ocours in delivering the eventual output.
C. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The main advantage that a government agency holds over
any possible output competitor is the barrier to entry
represented by the legal mandate to perform the mission. A
cost Ieadrship strategy can erect a further barrier to
ntr- :L the current government climate o restrictive
C cnaffir , zct iea e.ship is an excellent supporting
rt ratega.
This apr: oach particula:. y su its expansion of an agency
into, re'ated or multiple mission&, which, buili on existing
duties. : little margina, cost is ir.curred to accomplish
4h. '1e tas:.., fixe& expenses are spread over a wideL
r& f' cC activity, further decreasing unit costs. Such a
scen--c serve as a possible explanation for the inception
of the Maritime Defense Zone.
The Navy faced increasing g'obal responsibilities and
saw the Coast Guard as the relatively low cost provider of
needed security in U.S. coastal zones. Procurement costs
for providing the Coast Guard with upgraded communications
and weapons systems were minimal compared to the Navy's cost
of constructing a separate capability.
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The Coast Guard Reserve similarly enjoys this type of
comparative advantage and fills needs in the active duty
Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has increasing
responsibilities in a]. mission areas. In certain missions
the Reserve is the low cost provider of manpower. Those
situations occur, where Reserve training programs can meet
the ski1 needs at a cost lower than an active duty
resource.
SL-, even though government agencies genera " lack a
roft mechanisr., the Coast Guard Reserve faces competition
at.a:v ev s. Even with a legal mandate :t ceo~n; the
1 oZ- I , c ompetitIon for resources occurs in the
(rena agaInst Cthe: agencies. The r.i itary
th general society. As an armed
C, a Gua:- epa-es fc competition against
oppcnents. Give: this genera: framrewcrk of
.. ratec, fo r..2atior see k t deve'lop
a terna tves which exp oit the cdesired comparative advantage
at :.h1 ?: .i- eves of compe ticon, -acing various
opponents.
D. FORMULATION PHASE
The formulation phase includes defining the
organization's goals, assessing the environment, and




The Coast Guard Reserve defines its goals as
follows:
The purpose of the Coast Guard Reserve is to provide
trained units and qualified persons for active duty in
the Coast Guard in time of war or national emergency.
(U.S. Coast Guard,October 19,1988,p. 2)
The organization that evolves from this goal will depend on
the amount of resources obtained and the transformation of
these resource to provide output. The financial resources
obtained will depend on political decisions in Congress.
Flnancial resources will impact the econorrics of recruiting
manpower. Transformat-on by training will determine the
capab..LitY, of the force to perform in war or emergc-ncies.
Congress se.E the broad goal for the Coast Guard
Reserve in at G r zation app IprIation bil1S.
:nternally, the Coast Guard Reserve establishes subordinate
... zesource competition, transforming processes, and
capability of the final output. information in the budget
and oth control systems reveals the strategy's emphasis in
these subordinate areas. To meet the overarching goal,
strategy considers the environment to discover ways of
gaining or exploiting a comparative advantage. Subordinate
goals may be established relative to specific threats and
competitors. Strategy attempts to relate these subordinate
goals to accomplishment of the overarching goal.
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2. Environment
This section examines environmental conditions. The
environment substantially impacted the Coast Guard,
especially the Reserve's two primary resources: people and
money. Economic conditions changed competition for funding
with other agencies in Congress. Demographic factors
changed competition for manpower. The demand for
Congressional funding is increasing, and the availability of
ranpowelr for the Armed Services is decreasing. These
cor.ditioia affected the resources obtained Ly
th- Coast Guard. In turn these resources cons-i-aine6 the
CcLt. Guarc as it attempted to perform its m io::s
a. Resources: The input Environment
The iabcl f: rce is changing due tc the following
6 emog i aphc trends:
Ti r ... :. to 4 years peaked in 1C,61 at 3".5
-c.- a t3a:[ that may not be surpassed for at least
ii E--e..V-0 eai. This -itary-a:e" grou wil
d t E n around 7 mlion througl-. 1996 and then
ga(.a y i ncrease again to peak at aiound 7 m-11ion
. the population level in 1987) ....
F 1r<.. 972 through 1984, the populaticn of :&-year-
olds exceeded 4 million each year, peaking at 4.5
mi7io; in 198'. For most of the 1990s, the '9-year-old
cohort will number fewer than 3.4 million, about three-
quarters the size of the 1980 level. In the year 2010,
it is projected that there will be 3.9 million persons
at this age, historically the median age of military
recruits ....
The U.S. population is aging: the median age
nationwide was 31.5 years in 1985; in 2010, the median
age is expected to be more than 5 years older, as the
youngest members of the "baby boom" generation (born
between 1946 and 1964) celebrate their 46th birthday.
in 1985, there were 28.6 million Americans age 65 or
older, representing just under 12 percent of the
population. n 2010, the number of persons in this age
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group will be about 39.2 million, const4utngclset
14 percent of the total population--with those 8o or
older numbering almost 8 million more than in 1985.
(EiLte'Lberg,1963,p. 7)
The Coast Guard strategy competed for
Congressional funding to meet all its program needs,
including expected increases in recruiting costs. At the
same., time, competition for Congressional funding increased
from other agencies in the Federal government, driven in
part LY the same demographic trend-=. The aging population.
reo-:~~nceasz~resou~rces -:n entztlement a~eas as shown
:~:~ ~,c: h fo' lowing page.
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Entillement Payments for Individuals as i
Percentage of Cross National Product. Fiscal Years 196%5-86'
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'Social security and related programs includes old age and survivors' insurance, social
security disability insurance, and railroad retirement. Federal employee retirement
includes military and Coast Cuard retirement pay, civil service and foreign service
retirement and disability, and compensation paid to veterans and their survivors as a
result of service-related death or disability. Public assistance includes supplemental
security income, grants to the states for aid to families with dependent children, food
stamps. the earned income lax credit, and veterans' pensions. Health includes medicare
hospital insurance. medicare supplementary medical insurance, and grants to the states
for medicaid. Unemployment includes unemployment compensation, trade adjustment
assistance, and federal employee unemployment benefits. Other includes child nutrition
programs, the special milk program, guaranteed student loans, veterans' readjustment and
education benefits, coal miners' (black lung) disability benefits, special workers' compen-
sation expenses. Veterans' Administration burial benefits, and the national service and
U.S. government life insurance fund for veterans.
Source: Kent Weaver. 'Controlling Entitlements," in John E. Chubb and Paul E.
Peterson. eds. The New Direction in American Politics (Washington, D.C. Brookings,
1985, p. 3 13.
Figure 5 (Wildavsky,1988,p. 270)
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Eesides demographic trends, Gramm-Rudman further
squeezed government spending, by limiting spending to
revenue from taxes plus a declining deficit balance. With
continued gains in entitlements and limited growth in
government spending as a result of Gramm-Rudman, the Coast
Guard faced increasing competition for the remaining dollars
in the Federal budget.
b. Missions: The Output Environment
The competition for input resources is a means
tcI ar -r.d. The desire fc': increased funding ano, manpowez
sezves the goa: cf providing more output to tht eventual
consumers of the organization's goods and strvices. As
.:ed..z hr!- discussion of Nzv,. missions,
.wt- mu t emphasize outpu .... because a r.at -n of
concetie2 free citizens a:, skept"ca. -axpaytLE is
natu-ally moLe interested In what is harvested tha in
-ur 
- .Z7
focus on output forces an orga.-£zation to
articulate it. value. That is, an organization must compare
the results of its existence versus the absence of that
organization. The results of this analysis should show that
the benefits are greater than the costs; in other words,
some value is created by the organization.
Wildavsky identified the general tactic in using
output to compete for Congressional funding as "Find a
clientele .... Serve your clientele .... Expand your clientele
(Wildavsky,!988,p. 101-02). The clientele provides a
4C
mea:s t,, :obby Congress fZ. increased appropriations.
Becausz of diversity in peacetime and wartime missions, the
Coast Guaid's clientele will vary with the mission. Lack of
a single large client limits the Coast Guard's power to
influence the Congressional appropriations process.
Diversity among clients adds and detracts from
the Coast Guard. One possible benefit is the more efficient
delivery cf services. To the extent that the Coast Guard
dots no' -C t y emp"cy its. resources perform*n; current
r. an.e ne, c: ex nanded mission can absc-b sore- cf
WJ t:.c . f- s In g ov e r a c sEt . SUc'- a c-i-s Z
F-:. a6 arar seve al sn e i nterest group.5 into a large,.
M_, ~ F C: - C, e r f nt 4.
. . : :" ,O- .-. 
Co: verse' y, the sarme procedure caL. 1rovide a
.fc-. whe:. the oas of these inerest groups
Lo not cc:.zi-. SIection o one goal al ienates the
r -~o: .t- f lke o po zing go a I The alienation affects
sup:te- both ".nside anc, outside the organization. Coast
.... leaders face a challenge to balance these competing
roles and missions, where they do not overlap. The
leadership's juggling ability impacts internal morale and
external political support.
The competition for funding overlaps the
competition for the lega: mandate to perform solely the
assigned government functions. Nearly every mission of the
Coast Guari is peripherally performed with other government
4o
agencies. For example the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs
and the Coast Guard all perform some drug interdiction in
the maritime regions. The Department of Defense also is
being tasked with an expanded drug interdiction mission.
with the exception of Ice Operations, Marine
Licensing, and offshore Maritime Search and Rescue, the
Coast Guard shares some portion of its remaining eight
missions with other organizations. For a listing of Coast
Guard missions and their competition, see Appendix A. These
cve.,!as in mission responsibility result both from politics
a:d concer.s fc. efficiency. Assignment of an addktiona
.io: can absorb slack, making government more efficient.
:zc-weve. ,redundant capabilities can a'.so inflate the overall
coz- c: lrovclding government goods and services.
.his. concern fC government effice:-cy helped
-he Coast Guard assume a formal role in the Maritime Defense
Zo:.e. The Defense Department's need to piotect its supply
chasm, including origins, coupled with increasing Defense
budgets in the 1980's was a catalyst. for the Maritime
Defense Zone concept. New Navy commands (headed by Coast
Guard Vice-Admirals, directing Navy and Coast Guard units)
were quickly established to defend U.S. coastal areas and
vital ports of embarkation.
However, this concept also introduced a very
rea' threat of competition. This threat materialized in
military operations centers when Navy reservists worked
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interchangeably in billets also filled by Coast Guard
reservists. Significant capabilities also exist within the
Navy in small boats, riverine, and other coastal patrol
activities. These capabilities can substitute for the Coast
Guard or its Reserve.
A similar situation occurs in peacetime missions.
In 1972, the Congress mandated that the Coast Guard
Reserve augment the active service as a peacetime
mission. (Sparks,1989,p. 1-5)
Unfortunately, any increased performarnce cf peacetime
sc ... by Reservists could reduce the need for active duty
e _-ource tc i -o:: t h  same mission. Tht. active duty
Coz Guard may oppose growth of t R r i
ow _.,the Reserve, if: it
a ccom'anae ;, decle- E aco/vt c..y strengt .. And the
assIgnment of peacetime and wartime missions ir.jects the
a b-"... te the t'- mzs ScnZ, ad o a 1
c a-nP e:t. I'c r t he c~ G --a16:. ' ;.recs_;o ur ce S.
c. E- vJ:-onrrnt 4 onclusion
TVe t- at . ....
:nvesginatu the environment identified
lncreasir competiti on for resources. Other government
agencies desire funding; civilian and military organizations
compete for manpower. This competition extended to the
output arena, where organizations' missions encroached on
opponents. Some agencies expanded, assuming missions that
complemented their existing purposes. The Maritime Defense
Zone concept exemplified this expansion by the Coast Guard.
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However, this mission blurs the distinction
between services, especially as manpower sources. This
potentially threatens the Coast Guard Reserve's status as
the sole provider of manpower to meet expanded Coast Guard
needs during wartime. Wartime preparation also competes
with peacetime responsibilities. The strategy, through
contro: systems, needs to balance application of the
organization's resources between the various competitors for
output. The strategy also needs to relate its output to
resource requirements, to compete for those resources.
3. Futurity and Niche
T>h next stage in the strategy model aims to develop
aternat:ves andi examine their futurity. Alternatives
perta.n t- the m:ita y, poitica, and econoric arenas.
Th= military futurity concerns the consequence of mobilizing
the fc.zo Ci w atimo or national emergenc\. Ths
caculatio. ete:x cneI force size, training level, and
tzairnang focus. SimilarLy, the political futurity concerns
the cost of devoting additional resources to government and
the mix of different agencies within the government. The
economic futurity examines ways to attract manpower.
The futurity questions integrate information
obtained in the goals and environment sections. During the
1980's, the national agenda emphasized both Defense and Drug
Enforcement. This environment potentially favors the Coast
Guard and it, Reserve, with missions in both of these areas.
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a. Military
During the 1980's the Coast Guard revitalized
its wartime planning efforts. War plans were updated and
exercised. The source for much of this effort may have been
political. But the net affect was a closer examination of
these missions. Focusing on war and national emergencies
brought the mainstream of the Coast Guard closer to the
mission of the Reserve.
The active duty Coast Guard retained
responsiblity for drafting an' executing war plans. The
Rese!ve Program served as a manpower broke. to provide
trarneC personnel, who would expand existing units. Thus,
. Coas:t Guard Reserve emphasfzed people and training. It
IlC not have to identify a war strategy, only develop
manT~owE:" xn resIonse t- the strategy's military needs.
Poitica'
From FY 198c-FY. :989, the authorized strength of
Department cf Defense reserve components rose 38.1% and
apr'opiations increased 83.4% (in constant FY 80 dollars)
(U.S. Coast Guard,July,1989, p. 2). Because Congress
traditionally funds DOD at 95% or more of their estimated
wartime needs, the Coast Guard wanted its reserve to mirror
the Department of Defense (DOD) in relative size.
Coast Guard staffing in the early 1980's was
approximately 50% of their estimated wartime needs. Public
Law i00-183 directed
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the Secretary of Transportation to submit to Congress a
plan to enable the Coast Guard to meet 95% of its
wartime mobilization requirements by 30 September 1988
(Department of Transportation, 1988,p. 1)
This Congressiona" mandate also focused attention on the
question of force size. The Secretary's response indicated
a shortfall between "7,800 and 14,125" persons (Department
of Transportation,1988,p. 1). Once political forces
encouraged this alternative, the Coast Guard devoted few
resources to developing other options.
Given their goas and short tern. environment,
th Coa:, Guard emphasized growth. The growth focus takes
fu> advantage of the poitical environment in Congress,
b;.t , i rm l m ed emphasis of wartime ove- peacetlme
Econon.~c
n a -t-,9 - cce$ -n the
13' iin srite Of the demographic trends. Th= strategy's
C0.Ce::. w O aD aini C- pe1sor:ne esou:, eperd,:. on
eoucationa' benefits.
Today thert i l recognition in a circles that
educational benefits can be a very important attraction
of military service; and, furthermore, these benefits
can be targeted to specific markets of highly qualified
youths. (Eitelberg,1988,p. 17)
However, other competitors in the labor market
wil: match these enticements if they want to compete. Other
armed services use different levels of educational benefits
to a:, in recruiting. The inescapable impact of this
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declining supply of manpower is that the recruiting
environment will become more competitive, given the same
demand for entry level personnel. In response to the
increasingly competitive market, the Coast Guard transferred
recruiting responsibility to newly created Regional
Recruiting Commands in 1986.
d. Budqet Confirmation of Strategy
During the 1980's the budget institutionalized a
basic structure of expenses for the Reserve Program. The
.. g. pl o:e._ focusew on changinc these costs only
marginal:.. These changes depended on expansion c Z
contraction. di the size of tht reserve force. Accoarding y,
Ufa. - d . c -f - ..... .... . coast Guard Reserve's formulated
-atej,. 7-> ful owfng summa::y c the FY 929 budget shows
,'anne:" eyenditure , (in I thousands):
Reservists ' Weeken Drill Pay (DT 24,700
Feservists' 2 Week> nnu. Training Pay (ADT) 9500
.. o ,..ta 34,:0,0
500





















Internal budget development documents revealed
limited analysis on these "base" expenditures. Management
emphasized incremental changes to this base, in the Resource
Change Proposal process. Requests for Congressional
appropriations defended this base and proposed increases.
1'ie highest priority for increased funding
focused on increasing the number of Selecte Reservists,
compared with quantitative or qualitative changt i any
ethel areas or aspects. Recruiting received constant
em a : 1fr:; 98C-19. The Rear Admiral heading the
Reserv= Eroga-. wrote personal letters to District
Commance- encouraging then, to recruit additional
reservists, ever, if those numbers slightly exceeded
authozized strength ceilings. Growth was the primary focus
icr budget increases in fiscal years 1988 and 1989. In
1988, the number one priority was to increase reserve
manpower by 500 persons, at an additional cost of $5.7
million (Coast Guard,1986,p. 3). In 1989, the service faced
increased competition in recruiting. To meet this
challenge, they requested funding for additional reservists
and a larger recruiting force (Coast Guard,1987,p. 1), while
lowe: p:.crities addressed training programs.
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4. Formulation Conclusion
This analysis has shown that the Coast Guard Reserve
has no formal process for formulating strategy. Examining
goals, the environment, alternatives and their futurity, and
the budget process allowed inference of one main
alternative:
- Mirror the Department of Defense and request manning at
95% of wartime requirements
- Focus on the size of the Reserve Force as the key issue
- Ma2.ntain the current resource base, and attain growth
through increased Congressional funding
Th:E addles& - the initial question.r in the strategy
rrodel:
- What art. the organization's goals 7 (oas)
- Wha. are the consequences of alternatives- (F" turity)
,,-ve,, fcrrl tatio and consideration of alternatives
a: .... o be i,>. Tert~a, ~po]tica forces, and lack
-f staff to develop alternatives, a!' played some roie in
t. ' the development and consideration of alternatives.
The imri e strategy concentrated on the input
a1-ea, competi:.; for additional resources;. This
concentratloi linkea' to the output focus of the Maritime
Defense Zone mission. There is no direct evidence to
confirm the comparative advantage that the Coast Guard
Reserve sought to obtain, develop, or exploit. The general
nature of government organizations confirms that an entry
bariie- exists to legally restrict competitors to the Coast
Guard Reserve.
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The Coast Guard reorganized its district offices and
headquarters to merge war planning and reserve management
unde a staff element entitled Readiness & Reserve. No
lower field level reorganizations occurred. The net affect
was to formalize under one manager, the resources
responsible for developing and executing the Coast Guard's
wartime strategy, with the resources responsible for
training reservists who execute part of that strategy.
Otherwise, planners postulated an expansion of the existing
organization to absorb any growth in the Reserve force.
0 1 nma.I in the implementation phase confirr.ms these
or CuSIon.
E. IMPLEMENTATION
Tre fina: question in tne strategy model concerns
conto.oL. i:--lementato,_. The Coast Guard a-oo:rplishes
implemen:ation with the budget and a series of management
reports. These include spending, activities, and readiness
reports.
1. Budget
The budget is a control mechanism for
implementation: it sets targets for expenditures. The
budget translates the strategy into financial terms.
Control activities depend on these quantitative measures to
monitor and enable implementation. Monitoring budget
execution, comparing actual expenditures agair.t these
50
targets, identifies problem areas for corrective actions.
Full expenditure of all money appropriated by Congress is
critically important to the growth strategy. It is hard to
request more funding next year, when an agency has not spent
a smaller amount in the preceding year. Wildavsky
illustrates this situation by saying:
If an agency has a substantial carryover, the Budget
Bureau and especially the appropriations committees may
take this as a sign that the agency does not need as
much as it received and may cut off that amount in the
future. (Wildavsky,1988,pp. 89-90)
Th~s explanation aisc applies to recruiting. There
te Reserve sought to show that it would fill al: existing
bI: ets a- . pre.ude to requesting additional manpower.
2. Spending and Activities Reports
Q-uarteLly spending summraries report status of funds
and ledger ob!*Qat ons. The status of funds repozt advises
1nte -tIo.us t fuliy spend the budgeted amounts for a
qua tei. Reporting occurs two weeks before the end of the
quarter. The ledger obligations show the amounts obligated
fo specific purposes during the quarter.
The activities reports summarize man-hours or days
of training activities performed by reservists. Monthly
reports list the weekend drills, and quarterly reports count
the two week active duty training periods. Apportionment
targets for time spent on weekend drills include 65%
augmentation, 25% formal training, and 10% unit
5-J
administration. The twc week active duty training report
includes the number of total days according to the major
training activity perormed in the period. Again, existence
of these reports suggests the importance of fully spending
budgeted amounts and completing a prescribed quantity of
training activities.
3. Readiness Reports
Although the activities and spending reports provide
a picture of expenses (what was done), the readiness repozts
ad(iess ef.creYncy anJ effectiveness (how we2 it was done;.
These inspertions grade individual reserve units or. :'e=r
prera:ai ois to " espond to a genera: war oilization. The
e...-..as.s iii this report shifts from resourre consrfptlon tc
Th t readinesr evaiuat.ona woud indicate any
degradatlons In fcrce qai . Howeve", subtanzia:
revIzIons tc t hr evaIuation during the 197 L negate
comparlson . The emphasis of this report oz. wartime
missiuns implies that a unit commander's success depends
more on the ability to prepare for war versus peacetime
missions.
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter traced the current Coast Guard strategy
through the model outlined in Chapter II. The Coast Guard
facer increased competition for Congressiona. funding and
5 2
workers. In response, it emphasized military missions and
drug enforcement as a means to compete for funding and
growth. Educationa' benefits and reorganization of the
recruiting function helped to compete for manpower.
internal control activities identified the key
activities critical to the success of the Coast Guard's
strategy. Controls focused on full consumption of
resourceZ, full performance (quantity) of training
a nsa. readiness of reservists for geuera
io zia t c. These indicators combine to confirr.. the
... chapter evaluates the success of this strategy,
ar. ....... problems and their causes. Sucl. analysis
w. -.c, so re torr:o.ow's p'c12ems. The continuc_-b change
e.h-  on e nrt dictates constant eva uatcn and
a c: ap a ~c.°  y orgar. aza.c i-:ract:-cing strategy.
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
This chapter evaluates the strategy outlined in the
previous chapter. Evaluating any strategy requires some
device for measurement against criteria and standards. The
Coast Guard Reserve has no formal documentation of its
strategy, which would indicate its aspirations in the
spectrum between survival and domination. The Coast Guard
Reserve's strategy clearly called for growth, but such a
gambit could easily serve to conceal a more modest goal of
survival. Therefore the evaluation in this chapter is
relative to some assumed goals of the strategy.
4esic es the goa. of growth oz survival, the strategy can
measure£ by adherence to strategic principles. Based on
these vazlous measures, different degrees of success
occurrec. Where some weaknesses are identified (relative to
a specific goal), analysis will indicate problems and their
causes. Chapter V will develop some specific solutions.
However, the entire evaluation of strategy and its success,
as Liddell Hart cited, depends on your "own point of view."
B. ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH/SURVIVAL
From FY 1980-1989, Selected Reserve strength grew 11.1%
and appropriations grew by 4.0% (in constant FY 80
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doliars)(Coast Guard,November,1989,p. 2). The ratio of
force size to appropriations suggests that either fewer
relative dollars delivered the same or higher quality force
due to increased efficiency, or holding efficiency
constant, the force size grew while the quality declined.
Confirming the correct conclusion requires a definition of
mission performance, and no such definition exists. A mix
between the two alternatives is also possible, but again
unprovaz. e.
When viewed in annual increments, the strategy's
manpower quantity results declined in 1988 and 1989. From a
peak of neary 13,000 in 2987, strength declined to just
cve: 12,50^ in 1983, and to apprcximately 12,200 in 1989
(Cn Gua d,Novembe ,1909,2. 2). Funding also peaked in
at. SOM, declined $5M 1988, and recovered to around
7'::: fi:u~es in constant FY 89 dcllars.) The
- in FY 89 differed by only 4% from the funding
leve-. of FY 80 (in constant FY 89 dollars).
Compared to the growth of the active duty Coast Guard,
Navy and Navy Reserve, the Coast Guard Reserve declined.
Figure 6, on the following page, shows the time trend during
the 1980's of these organizations' appropriations. All
dollars are in 1989 dollars; and 1980 equals 100%.
Appendix B contains the data used to construct Figure 6.
Comparison of Navy and Coast Guard
Active and Reserve
400%-
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If the strategy's goal was growth to a force size of
approximately 20,000 selected reservists, then the strategy
was unsuccessful. However, if the goal was to maintain the
selected reserve at 1980 levels, then success occurred. The
main reason for failure to achieve growth is unsuccessful
competition in the Congressional arena for funding. Based
on desires to expand the size of the Reserve force, future
strategy must develop some means to obtain additional
funding.
C. THEORETICAL VALIDITY OF STRATEGY
A theoretical basis can also evaluate the success of a
strategy. The criteria for evaluating strategies from page
3, iderntifled foul main areas: consonance, consistency,
feasiXKity and advantage. in retrospect, each of these
factors influenced and limited the Coast Guard Reserve's
strateuy. Some cf the strategy's problems appeared in more
than-- c. area. Examining each cf the four main areas will
identify these pioblems.
1. Consonance
The consonance criterion focuses on the previously
discussed desire for growth. The criterion states that:
The strategy must represent an adaptive response to the
external environment and to the critical changes
occurring within it. (Quinn and others,1988, p. 51)
Changes in the environment indicated an increasing
competit~on for resources. The Reserve hoped to compete for
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additional funding by documenting serious manpower
shortfalls. The consonance aspect reaffirms conclusions
from section B. in this chapter.
2. Consistency of Goals and Policies
The consistency criterion states that:
The strategy must not present mutually inconsistent goals
and policies. (Quinn and others,1988,p. 51)
The organization's goal continues to be providing a trained
force in time of mobilization. The strategist knows from
his study of the environment, that competition for resources
s incieasing. This may mean reduced resource levels for
the Coast Guard Reserve. if so, the resources obtained
z;ho-.i be focused on the most important goals of the
organization.
Fcr example, traiiiing the wrong people for the wrong
f:iO . Kil squander scarce resources. Such inefficiency
co~crses an agency's credibility with Congress. Within
the organization, such contradictions deflate morale. The
Congressional affect diminishes the agency's ability to
compete for increasingly coveted resources.
The goal of providing a trained force in time of
mobilization can vary depending on the force size, level of
training, and type of war, national emergency or
mobilization. The control systems confirm to subordinate
managers the emphasis among these goals as desired by top
management. But the control systems contain some inherent
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limitations that confound the communication of
organizational intentions. However, control systems were
effective if the goal was maintaining the size of the
Reserve force at 1980 levels.
Given additional goals, the control systems were
less effective. Coast Guard directives task Reserve Units
with training for mobilization. An additional goal
emphasizes that 65% of that training should occur as
augmentation, where performance of a regular peacetime
rcissio:, effectively tralns reservists for thei-r mobilization
ass1gn me.... ThE opportunity for augmentatio: vaies
d amat ca Iy between reserve units, and this variance
c eate!, consistency problems within the goads of the
Fe S e r V -.
A unit's location adjacent to its muilization site
a' t: oppc n to accomplish augmentation.
AvgnLe-,a-,. n equires an overlap between peacetime and
wart ime Sh 1s which does not always occur. Personalities
a, -.,un. :evt a!so compromise the potentia, to perform
augmentation. The active duty Commanding Officer can
preclude effective augmentation by not tasking the
reservists with missions or denying access to the equipment
needed to perform the mission.
Location of a Reserve Unit away from its
mobilization site, or proximate to active units performing
different missions creates additional limitations. For
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example, a reserve unit's mobilization mission could be
supervision of ammunition loading. Yet reserve units with
this mission are not always located where these activities
occur in peacetime. Thus, augmentation in many ways can
present mutually inconsistent goals. And the budget
seemingly does not distinguish between reserve units based
on the degree of difficulty in completing training.
3. Feasibility
This augmentation situation coupled with a rack of
budgetary response also violates the feasibility criterion.
This criterion states that "the strategy murt neither
overta' ava'able resources nor create unsolvable
subpzoblems (Quinn and others,1988,p. 51)." UnIess the
budget links resource levels with training needs, the Coast
GuarK Reserve's strategy violates the feasibility criterion.
.th " ccnreL repcrts might confirn. this problem; instead,
they E ombiniP with ic: ons Etent goals to furthe: mask tA
Again, con-trol eports generally direct the Reserve
field organization towards desired goals. But the time
sequence for submission precludes any automatic responses
which correct off-target activities. All reports arrive at
Headquarters after the significant activity occurs, so,
intervention can only focus on long term remedies.
Another limitation in these controls is moral
hazard. a condition which occurs when, according to Baumol,
6C
"Payment. by results. .. .e~cits an attempt to change the state
Of nature (Baumo',,'C'_,p. 16)." A degree of moral hazard is
present -in eac:. of' these controls: the activities report,
the ledgers, and the readiness evaluation (as described in
Chapter III-E>.
Moral hazard would compromise the activities report
when weekend dr-'i activities could be rationalized to fit
rnox thn oe caegoy o the 65-25-10 distr-ibution (see
page 45'. Shiftinc. drills from one category to another
w c. ;F. c h eve the de- ired distribution, even though the
ula 1y n a-t ivit did no;t change.
Th1;e I ecge,. £ on~ y report amounts chb':gate6 or
eararkc fr sjezi~cPurpose. Ifmanagers were low on
f~z:~c . rth_:Ing pre a_..Ue _;N a low estimate ox. the cost of a
rlcec Mar,- -. a tig daz-a in either- direction would allow
a o  cu ".t in system be~r.9 ntiod-,ce i fiscal
yea:.- C hel6i ii~t the poten-tial for this p-actnice.
rt-- syzste,:,. allows real time accessz tc managers at all
:eve'.E, wr.L car.n~rri~ the amount of actual xedtrs
as they occur. The potential improveme..t cannot be
coanrf ir m e u. the system. is fully operational .
The readiness reports are also susceptible to moral
haza. U:..t can, report training levels and qualifications
beyond- what members actually attain. Unless these basic
Zecczc: a:, checkecd, scores become falsely inflated.
Readiness reports only address wartime scenarios, but unit
commanding officers also have responsibilities to prepare
fo:r natural disasters. However, the Coast Guard does not
evaluate the state of readiness for this contingency. Here
again, goals are not consistently controlled, and without
resource links, they are also unfeasible.
4. Advantage
The last criterion addresses advantage, "The
strategy must provide for the creation and/or maintenance of
competitive advantage in the selected area of activity
(Quin anC ethers,1988,p. 51)." The advantage criterion
shows a major weakness -n not having a st:ategy making
, nce the advantage is not clearly identifIed, its
creatiori and maintenance cannot be intearated in all the
organ-zaton's processes.
Thc ccnsistenct a n d feasibility areas already
deatonstate, the potential fcc systems to become
dysfunctiona' towarcds suppcrting the comprehensive strategy.
Nloreovei , some advantage needs tc be identified which is
consonant with the environment. The Coast Guard Reserve's
strategy suffered from flaws in each of the four areas
evaluated. Some problems overlapped and affected more than
one area. Problems in control systems of timeliness and
moral hazard require solution. Strategy formulation aspires
to address all of these areas simultaneously, so that
solutions to problems in one area support the other areas.
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The budget provides an integrating mechanism, linking the
organization's goals and problems with the resources
earmarked to accomplish goals and solve problems.
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Chapter IV reviewed the strategy of the Coast Guard
Reserve, evaluated its success and sources of problems. The
Coast Guard emphasized military roles and manpower
shortfalls, but the Reserve force did not grow as expected.
Congress did not provide additional funding. If the goal was
growth, then, suzces& was limited; if the goal was survival,
tr*E Stra;tO'g. W .s Mar:f Successful,
C:; a theoretica' basis, the strategy suffered especially
from a -ac of con-:te :cy and feasibility. Moreover, some
systenatic baszs is needed to identify and implement a
comparative advantage. Some means to document the efficient
dse of existi.r.7 resources could help the Coast Guard compete
.o resou -1 Better methods of directing resources,
regardlesz cf the level received, could improve attainment
of goa>-.
The next chapter uses the budget to propose an
alternative which solves these problems.
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V. IMPROVEMENTS TO PREVIOUS STRATEGY
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
This chapter uses the budget to solve specific problems
identified in the previous chapter, including a
clarification of goals and improved control systems which
ensure that attainment of goals is feasible. The budget can
perform this function, but not in its present form.
The budget and other control systems currently focus on
LL- consumption of resources. Eut, consumption is not the
organization's goal. The Reserve intends to provide a
service to the nation. And as Turner noted, the nation is
more interested in output. The budget could identify output
t.h. e fi r. anc ' inputs were tracked as assets, in an
accounting sense. The purpose of this chapter is to track
the organization's resources through the budget.
The first section defines an organization's activities
as expenses and assets. The next section differentiates
between the various types of assets. Following this, a
clarification of output is offered by viewing a skills model
and the difference between present and future consumption.
Finally, a control system is proposed to use the budget in
its reconstituted form. By discussing the organization in
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this framework, the chapter will offer solutions to some of
the problems identified in Chapter IV.
B. ASSETS AND EXPENSES
Budgets describe an organization's plan for transforming
resources. The Coast Guard Reserve consumes people and
money, and produces various services. Accounting concepts
express this process in terms of assets and expenses.
Assets are
eccnom:' rescurces: owned by an entity whose cost at the
.... or acquis-::on can be objectively measured .... A
U r Ce ian economic resource if it provides future
the entity. Resources provide future benefits
under any Cf three ccnditions: () they are money or can
hbe conve-ted *.o money; (2) they are goods which are
e:.:rerted to be sold; cr (3) they are expected to be used
: u cru activities of the entity. (Reece & Anthony,
Exrenser are
those costs which are identified with particular streams
02n *u:re.. output as distinct from those costs.. which
w norma:y b - ien:-ied with future steaTs of
o utuc. Cost: whach cannot iogica LIy be identified with
a: st reams of output, either past, present, or future,
a "losses." (Paton,1944,p. 126)
An expense is an expired asset that produces some value.
This difference between potential and consumption links
assets and expenses.
The Coast Guard obtains assets in the form of
appropriations from Congress. It then either transforms
these into other assets, or consumes them as expenses. A
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budget is an organization's plan for converting assets into
other assets or expenses.
In simplest terms, unless some value remains from a
budgeted activity at the end of the year, that activity
becomes an expense sometime during the year. The expiration
of the asset into an expense should give rise to some output
desired by a consumer of the organization's services. In
business, revenue would measure the desirability of the
sezvyce. Howevei governments generally do not charge for
services. The main value in conceptualizing an
organizaticn: '.. act.vities in ...s wa
- 
,s that it shifts the
focus from consumption to outp ut-.
T :c- ng reservistS and improving thei a Ility t
perforir. d'-g moilizatlon is an example of converting one
asset (payol dollars) into another asset (trained
reservists). Using the training to perform the mission
exem:.- f es the expense process; consuming tis asset
creates an expense. The value of that service' tc the
befi cla-y should exceed the cost of providing the service.
C. PRESENT VS. FUTURE CONSUMPTION
The budget shows expiration of assets for a single year
as they become expenses. Some of the remaining assets will
become expenses in future years. By measuring this
depreciation, the "present value" of training activities can
be calculated . The "present value" concept projects
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tiaining benefits into the future to measure their residual
value. Restated, the present value measures the total value
of a training activity, including the decay of the skill
over time.
This comparison presumes equal dollars invested today
into two different training programs. The benefits or
skills continue into future years, decaying at various
rates. One computes the present value by measuring the
5kil" levtK at regular intervals, and adding the consecutive
. . .. sccr-e :rncates the greater value per
tscr intats then , "
..... t iar:nc decisions ':this. framewozk, emphasizes
-t .impazt ci attr .tio. The cost cf a training activi ty
cu.K . : ecoupe :.e ove; seveait yea-. To meet this
...... .a:7 me s cften agree to an add "tional
t s .v c -ass gne . to certain tra nng
Th.-- format ca.. a'sz shcw the cost to the service when
L.: fc ii- ser ic whaent -
0e1s seaat fro-n. the service, takin with
then. t:-airni anc experience which will be expensive to
repI , ce.
I: f-nancial terms, the organization's output becomes
either other assets or expenses. However, the training
level of reservists is difficult to quantify in dollars,
beyond the amount invested. To overcome this difficulty,
some quantification of training levels is necessary.
67
D. OUTPUT DEFINITION AND SKILLS MODEL
Use of the budget as a control mechanism requires
quantification of desired outputs, in terms of assets and
expenses. No such quantification comprehensively covers the
current Reserve force. A new skills model could perform
this function, employing a method already used in the active
duty Coast Guard.
The model should quantify the force size, training
level, and training focus. The force size issue is simply a
qcjestic.. c.: numbers. However, the level of training and type
of mobihizatio. complicate the issue. Skills c. differ
-'.-c fro wartime to peacetime missions, ana also by
t'.e eve' of expertise required, and currency of skill
The curken: sh: .board training systeiT, responds to a
siia: irobe in training levels. A. individual fills a
h e' basec! on his pal grade and rating, one set of skills.
Different scenarios require different skill levels from the
same individu.. The navigation detai' could require an
individual to serve in his rating, fo: example, a
quartermaster performing navigation duties on the bridge
while entering port. Conversely, during law enforcement
evolutions, he might perform as a boarding officer, duty
unrelated to his rating. The job dictates the skills needed
by individuals. Then, the Personal Qualifications System
(PQS) organizes the training program to provide the
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necessary sk::' levels for each individual according to his
job assignments and regardless of his rating.
The PQS system also reflects currency of skill levels,
unlike the qualification code system presently used by the
Reserve. Qualification codes document that an individual
completed certain training at some point in his career.
With PQS, the individual must complete initial qualification
and periodic recertification. Thus, PQS shows not only the
progre 5 of an individual towards certIficat.cn, but his
cvre.c y. the skis as well. A better vision of readiness
wc.il :t .. Xc:. hink r t ,aiLing shortfal's with the cost
t r a ll ine& force.
TI. F? syste. can expan( tc: cover potentialy any
g nee&. eseLve IiIets, afloat and ashore, are now
the PQS syst em. This vehicle allows measuLrement
_ a:. >.&, .... . ai: '.. 'eve' Thus, an aggrecate skil
.: *..t ,ent fC the Coast Guard Reserve is possible,
w.ti. FC S coverino a:: required skills (peacetime and
warti me) a:-c:. all individuals.
A g1apl. caln simplify individual skil issues by
presenting a simultaneous picture of the various levels.
Each skill assigned to an individual is represented by a
ba.. The level of training in that particular skill is
shown by the height of the bar. The graph shows the number
of individuals, their assigned missions, and training level
fcr each mission. Figure 7 shows different training levels.
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These levels will vary according to the amount of resources
dedicated to training for each mission, and the efficiency
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Sy quantifying output, analysis can show the
relationship between inputs (budget dollars) and outputs
(training level./force size). This quantification empowers
the budget as a control mechanism for management. Without
t:°s input-output linkage, the budget is merely a plan to
consume assets. Moreover, by functioning in this manner,
the budget can compare the efficiency of different
alternatives and assist leaders in selecting the best
conh-nation of resources fcr a particular set of goals.
E. THE BUDGET AS A CONTROL SYSTEM
:, previous discussion2 emphasized the need to express
in er. of assets and expenses, and expressed in a
"i ,! Va -" co:.text. The output assets were the..
-ra;s at tnt- . sk I , r-. oee_ These concentua':zat ons
e:.e t L- usec. s_,, e ccntrc s: ster. As
suZ:, the cntro" syste,.. can improve the consistency and
:easi:itv' cf the strategy option selected.
Consr y s sterr. depen on sensors, selectors, and
effecto:s, a. linked by communication (p. 10). The budget
control system starts with the current asset base, the
trained reservists from previous years. The output model
serves as the sensor, revealing the exact training levels of
the Reserve force.
The strategist can then target specific desired outputs
for the current year, this decision functions as the
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selector mechanism. It links with the budget to designate
resources for production of those outputs. The supply of
financial resources provides the means to implement the
goals; this becomes the effector. This budget control
system would eliminate problems of consistency and
feasibility.
The selector in strategy extends beyond control and
directly relates to the strategic thrust of the
organization. Ansoff's model (from p. 16), divides strategic
thrusts into continuity and discontinuity modes. Continuity
thrusts are appropriate when the environment is stable, and
the orcani:zation is achieving its goals. Discontinuity
thrusts are needed to respond to a changing environment and
whe.. crganizational goals are not being achieved.
The Coast Guard Reserve cou'i use Pcrter's model to
conceptuai::e condItions within government. Placing the
:rganizational goals in this context wcuad indicate which
thrusts, continuity or discontinuity, are required.
Control systems stJll may suffer from "moral hazard."
And, the comprehensive strategy still needs to develop
consonance and advantage, activities which are difficult for
the budget to express. But, the expression of
organizational activities as outputs accomplishes two
purposes. First, it is needed to empower the budget as a
control mechanism. Second, it may help the Reserve compete
for resources fro- Congress, if Congress insists on more
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qu-,t f ication of an organization's accomplishments. In
this sense, the control mechanism is consonant with the
environment surrounding competition for funding.
The main advantage that a government agency exploits is
the leal barrier to entry faced by potential providers of
the same service. As existing agencies seek to expand into
complementary areas, cost efficiency may erect a further
barrier to entry. The budget could assist an organization
becoming the most efficient producer of a required
servce. W.. ut pt d e fr , the budget can a! ow
o :e: nput 'eve's to select the most
efficaent oti o.
a : the bo confor;.: to the ideas rresent ed in
ti- ch e wi-I hell to solve some of the previous
- " ez... The budget , as -n improved ccnrc syte71-1&budgt,  ystem
roKe.:. t" ~i:ean.: a:.1.y z a 1te naive, select the most
~fiierto~*,aC . C.: :c, ar. lem.n.i.
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
This chapter explored the use of the budget to solve
some of the problems in the existing Coast Guard Reserve
strategy. The concepts of assets and expenses focus on the
difference between future and current cons.mption. Training
increases reservists' future potential; this option
increases assets. Performance of a mission by a reservist
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prov.'des a current service; this option consumes assets, by
definiLtion an expense.
'n this framework, managers can shift resources betwee-n
future benefits and current consumption as dictated by the
needs of the situation. With output definition and a skills
model, the Coast Guard Reserve could clarify the exact
outputs desired from consumption of its financial resources.
Thenables the budget to function as a control system,
E 'iminating consistency arnd feasib"iiy problems.
Assocz-at-nc resourc- consumption with. the goalS of th
c - ca Z a - -on, w solve somre of the problems ListeE .-
The cc=.~ yster. based on the budget may aiscO asslsEt
ccn. o~a':eifCongress ist or. mo-,re quan-tifi-cation of an
orra. z a tc .. oup s 4st e f fi cI'e n c froam the budget
C 0'. Provid an aalaft na' advantage.. erect--n, a barrnie-, to
pct~ita.pzcviclers of the same service. The strat-egist
c exarr-ine the_ envione an_ sel et a strategic
thrut d~evton.Folovi-ng selection, control systems,
including the budget, guide the organization towards its
objectives.
Thus, there aie many benefits to altering the budget as
advocated in this chapter. And, these alterations will




Every organization faces decisions on ends and means.
Strategy attempts to address them simultaneously, to ensure
that the answers are properly related to each other. The
answers then are not unique. There are many ways to relate
means and ends; other methods could deliver a sinilarly
appropriate answer. The hope is that strategy can more
easily eu:-:c > improper answers. That is, by asking the
aprropriate questions, strategy can deliver the appropriate
answer2 , a nioc: accurate and timely mannei. The focus
then IS method in relaticn to results.
The Ccast Guard Resc-ve lacks an integrated strategy.
Uz nr a DuiE nes mode of strategy shower one possible
methc(: fo. foruting and implementing strategy. This
methcd enjoys the advantage of building around a budget, so
the Coast Guard Reserve could expand its existing budget
system to more fully practice strategy.
To adequately serve this purpose, the budget needs
adaptation to correct some flaws. In particular, the
Reserve needs to define output and coordinate goals,
resources and controls towards the desired output. The Coast
Guard is facing multiple decisions: Which method to use ?
Which goals to set ? How to control their implementation ?
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Simplifying these decisions, by placing them in a relational
context is one benefit from a strategic planning process.
The Commandant in his long range view, stated that
Budgetary constraints will require the Coast Guard to
meet its needs through improved productivity .... We will
make full use of the Reserve in augmenting all mission
areas as necessary. (Coast Guard,October,1989,p. 3)
The Coast Guard and the Reserve may need to jointly develop
a strategic planning process, to .ure that the Reserve's
role in the parent organization is appropriate. No thesis
could hope to encompass all of these issues. A collection
of the best talent available should examine the pLocess and
the issues to ensure inclusion of a17 relevant data.
So the thesis ends as it began, dealing with current
dec:sions and the future. The primary decision concerns
select~on of the method to make these decis-ons. The
qua ity cf plesent decision-s on threse issues wil' affect the
organization into the next century. The method to formulate
the issues and select the answers, should be appropriate to
the impact that the answers will create.
B. FINDINGS
This thesis examined strategy using the budget. The
primary research question asked: how does the Coast Guard
Reserve implement strategy in its budget ? To approach
this central issue, the thesis first asked: what is the
definition of strategy 7 Strategy was viewed as a system
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for making critical decisions on purpose and the future, in
response to competitive conditions. The process includes a
formulation and implementation stage, exploiting some
comparative advantage to dominate an opponent.
The practice of strategy addresses the following
questions:
- What are the organization's goals ? (Goals)
- Wnat is the environment ? (Environment)
- What are the alternatives ? (Alternatives)
- What are the consequences of alternatives ? (Futurity)
- What is our comparative advantage ' (Advantage)
- How can we best exploit the situation ? (Niche)
* -.. -:u we structure ? (Organization)
-Hew wI we contro. implerfientation ? (Control)
-}* will we evaluate the success of the
strategy and the neeJ for adaptation ? (Evaluation)
Th& budget serves as a control mechanisrr, estimating and
r:easurt; a goa' b itE cost. The strategist obtains and
tranor.:0s resourct- ji2to some crganizationai output. The
buget prescides a gaug., relating cost, progress towards
goals, and surviva. The strategy can be evaluated or; the
basis of consonance, consistency, feasibility, and
advantage.
Next, the thesis asked: what was the past strategy of
the Coast Guard Reserve ? Inference of recent strategy
revealed an orgaiiization seeking growth but facing
increas. j competition for resources, especially funding and
manpower. The Coast Guard Reserve emphasized military
missions and educational benefits respectively, to attract
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the needed resources. The budget and other control reports
focused on full consumption of resources.
Following this, the thesis asked: how effective was that
strategy ? Analysis of recent strategy showed varying
degrees of success depending on the perspective and
criterion of the evaluator. From a theoretical view, better
consistency and feasibility would improve the organization's
output. Accomplishment of goals was not controlled by
_i]-n resources to the level of attainment desired.
Finally, the thesis asked: how can the strategy be
improved ? By quantifying output, the budget can compare
va rous -Iternatives. The budget described the
clgaxization 's activities in terms of assets and expenses.
Kowevei, a definiticn of output is needed to empower the
budge4. as a control system. Together, the output definition
an. the budget could solve the consistency and feasibility
proh'., by linking resource consumption with the
crganiLzation''s goals.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The American culture of democracy and capitalism calls
for rational stewardship in the public domain. Ansoff
observed the increasing competition for resources and
commented:
The explosive growth of expenditures for government and
social welfare has reached a level at which inefficiency
can no longer be tolerated. As a result, the not-for-
profits are under growing pressure to emulate the
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efficiency of the business firm. (Ansoff,1979,p. 30)
To survive in such an environment, the Coast Guard Reserve,
must demonstrate high expertise in managing its resources,
and a strategic process is part of that management.
I recommend that the Coast Guard Reserve adopt a formal,
but not static, process of strategic management, which can
serve to ensure the vitality of the organization. The
strategic process should identify long term goals for the
organization and methods to achieve these goals. To be
effective the Reserve's strategy must be integrated with the
strategy of the active duty Coast Guard. To be realistic,
-he strategy wiV! be constrained by the amount of resources
aveilable in the Federal Government arena.
N,-:. specific mode: i s recommended for the strategic
2~r;,e t functic. Howevez:, tlis thesis idenrtiie6 many
cC th-cLL tica. issues. Any method used should capab'y
ac,: iess the relevant issues as shown in this thes's.
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APPENDIX A
Coast Guard Missions and Competitors
Mission Competitor
- Aids to Navigation Aids maintained by private
firms or civilians under
pilot program with contract
administered by Coast Guard
- Boating Safety Various state and local
government agencies
- Defense Operations Navy
- Environmental Response Federal Environmental
Protection Agency, various
state and local government
agencies
- Ice Operation None
- Maritime Law Enforcement Federal Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S.Customs
Service, various state and
local government agencies
- Marine Inspection American Bureau of Shipping
- Port Safety/Security Various state and local
government agencies
- Search and Rescue Department of Defense
various state and local
government agencies
- Waterways Management Army Corps of Engineers




Data used to construct Figure 6
(all figures in thousand dollars)
Nominal Budget Adiusted Budget
COAST GUARD RESERVE
1980 42675 66710 100
1981 49483 67470 101.14
1982 51483 65575 98.30
1983 54000 65990 98.92
1984 55355 65123 97.62
1985 59223 67352 10r,.96
1L986 58857 65028 97.48
1987 64400 69002 103.43
1933 62884 62884 94.26
COAST GUARD ACTIVE
1980 1115209 1743331 100
1I3697? 182297 104.57
1982 143S 2412.6 1888230 108.31
7983 1603798 1959914 112.42
1984 1690542 1988872 114.08
1985 1798908 2045841 117.3533 1617939 1787580 102.54
120 2275 1931077 110.77
198P 1782506 1782506 102.25
NAVY RESERVE
19e0 268054 419030 100
1931 31857E 434385 103.66
1901 374600 477136 113.87
1983 67843: 829066 197.85
1984 767100 902470 215.37
1965 1127012 1281715 305.88
1986 1264599 1397192 333.43
1987 1394892 1494580 356.68
1988 1512963 1512963 361.06
NAVY ACTIVE
1980 7351152 11491561 100
1981 8920295 12162932 105.84
1982 10324474 13150520 114.44
1983 10846708 13255172 115.35
1984 11445908 13465774 117.18
1985 15701274 17856560 155.39
1986 15875246 17539770 152.63
198" 17625440 18885074 164.34
1988 18237199 18237199 158.70
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